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Tax Expenditures to Limit the Growth of Carbon Emissions in Canada:
Identification and Evaluation
David G. Duff* and E. Ian Wiebe*
2009
I. Introduction
First used by then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley
Surrey in 1967,1 the concept of tax expenditures refers to aspects of tax legislation that
are designed not to implement the specific tax itself, but instead to encourage various
social and economic activities by reducing the amount of tax otherwise payable by
taxpayers who engage in these activities. Observing that these tax incentives are
functionally equivalent to government spending programs, Surrey argued that the U.S.
federal income tax actually consists of two parts:
one part comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income
tax on individual and corporate net income; the second part comprises a system of
tax expenditures under which Governmental financial assistance programs are
carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct Government
expenditures.2
While most tax expenditure literature has tended to focus on the income tax, not
consumption taxes,3 the same distinction could also be drawn for broad-based
consumption taxes, such as retail sales taxes or value-added taxes.4 For more narrowly

*

Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
J.D. Student, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
1
Stanley S. Surrey, Excerpts from remarks before The Money Marketeers on The U.S. Income Tax System
– The Need for a Full Accounting, (November 15, 1967), in United States Department of Treasury, Annual
Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1968, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969) at 322.
2
Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973) at 6.
3
Since the tax expenditure concept and most of the tax expenditure literature is American in origin, this
focus is not surprising, since the U.S. federal government does not collect a broad-based consumption tax.
4
Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1973) at 238.
*

1

based excise taxes, on the other hand, Surrey suggested that tax expenditures could not
exist.5
Although the mere identification of a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure
need not necessarily imply a normative judgment regarding its merits, in practice tax
expenditure analysis has typically been critical of tax expenditures for two general
reasons. First, on the grounds that they are generally unlimited in duration, without any
budgetary ceiling, subject to limited legislative oversight, administered by the revenue
authority rather than the government department that would otherwise be responsible for
a direct spending program,6 and poorly targeted to the kinds of marginal decisions that
they are intended to affect,7 tax expenditures are often criticized as a wasteful form of
government spending.8 Second, on the basis that they increase the complexity of the tax
system,9 distort economic decisions and necessitate higher tax rates to compensate for
foregone revenues,10 and provide “upside-down” subsidies when delivered in the form of
deductions or exemptions within a progressive income tax,11 tax expenditures are also
criticized as a questionable approach to tax policy – violating traditional tax policy
principles of simplicity, efficiency and equity.12

5

Ibid. at 233, stating that “[s]pecial excise taxes, being inherently limited in scope, involve no normative
provisions and thus are not candidates for such analysis.”
6
Stanley S. Surrey, “Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures” (1970), 83 Harvard Law Review 705 at 728-31.
7
Ibid. at 719-20, suggesting that "tax incentives are wasteful because some of the tax benefits go to
taxpayers for activities which they would have performed without the benefits.” While the same criticism
may also be levied against government subsidies as a whole, it is often argued that direct expenditures can
be more easily targeted to the kinds of marginal activities that the subsidy is intended to stimulate.
8
Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 32-37.
9
Ibid. at 26, emphasizing that “[t]ax simplification will be impossible if these tax expenditures persist.”
10
Surrey, “Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy” supra note 6 at 725-26.
11
Ibid. at 720-25, acknowledging (at 723), however, that a tax incentive delivered through a refundable flat
rate credit would not be subject to this criticism.
12
Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 25-27 and 69-98.
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Consequently, as the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation explains in a recent
review of tax expenditure analysis, Surrey intended that the concept would serve two
normative purposes.13 First, by subjecting tax expenditures to the same kind of legislative
scrutiny that is traditionally accorded to direct spending programs, Surrey hoped that the
concept would lead to greater control over government spending.14 Second, by
identifying various so-called “tax provisions” as spending programs, Surrey also hoped
that the concept would promote effective tax reform, as policymakers would recognize
that these provisions violated basic tax policy principles of equity, efficiency, and
administrative simplicity.15
In the years since Surrey formulated the notion of a tax expenditure, the concept
has had mixed success as a stimulus to legislative reform. While U.S. and Canadian
governments have produced regular tax expenditure reports in order to enhance the
visibility and potential legislative scrutiny of these measures,16 the number of tax
expenditures in the U.S. income tax has actually increased over the last 35 years,17
though it is impossible to confirm a similar trend from Canadian reports.18 As an impetus

13

U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis, (May 12, 2008) at 2-

3.
14

As the Joint Committee explains, “once tax expenditures were identified and clearly displayed as
government spending substitutes, subsequent dissection would reveal them to be poorly targeted or
inefficient, when compared either to an actual government spending program, or (in most cases) when
compared to not expending government resources at all.” Ibid. at 2-3.
15
Ibid. at 3.
16
In the U.S., Congress has published annual tax expenditure budgets since 1968. The federal Government
in Canada produced its first tax expenditure report in 1979. Department of Finance Canada, Government of
Canada Tax Expenditure Account: A Conceptual Analysis of Tax Preferences in the Federal Income and
Commodity Tax Systems, (December 1979). For Canadian tax expenditure reports from 1995 to 2008, see
http://www.fin.gc.ca/purl/taxexp-eng.asp (last accessed 23 October 2009).
17
U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 4, reporting that the number of federal income tax
expenditures identified by the Joint Committee has increased from 60 in 1972 to 170 in 2007.
18
Although the 1979 report stated that tax expenditures “have been growing more rapidly in recent years
than direct spending in a number of areas,” similar statements do not appear in more recent reports, and it is
difficult to distinguish differences in the reporting of tax expenditures from increases in their number or
estimated amounts.
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to legislative reform, therefore, one might be tempted to conclude that tax expenditure
analysis has been an abject failure. At the same time, however, tax expenditure analysis
has had a considerable effect on the design of tax expenditures, as these are increasingly
delivered in the form of credits rather than deductions or exemptions,19 are often
temporary in nature,20 and are occasionally subject to budgetary ceilings.21 As a result,
while tax expenditure analysis may not have reduced the number of tax expenditures, it
appears to have had considerable influence on tax policy and tax reform,22 and may yet
have some influence on public spending as a result of legislative sunsets and budgetary
ceilings.
This paper examines a particular category of tax expenditures in Canada, namely
tax expenditures that are designed to limit the growth of carbon emissions that contribute
to global warming. Unlike the U.S., which relies heavily on tax expenditures as
instruments of energy and climate change policy,23 Canada has introduced very few such
tax expenditures, relying instead on voluntary initiatives, direct subsidies, and limited
regulatory measures to limit carbon emissions.24 As background to this inquiry, Part II
reviews Canadian experience with carbon emissions over the last two decades and the
limited government response to this growing problem. Part III identifies the most
19

In Canada, for example, the deduction for charitable contributions was converted into a credit in 1988.
See David G. Duff, “Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax: Evaluating the Canadian
Credit,” in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman, and David Stevens, eds., Between State and Market: Essays on
Charities Law and Policy in Canada, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 407.
20
See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, “Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment,” [1988] Duke L.J. 1155 at 1171,
observing that the “sunsetting” of several tax expenditure provisions “suggests that Congress has partially
accepted the argument in favor of treating tax expenditures like spending programs for the purposes of
budgetary review.”
21
See the discussion of U.S. climate change tax expenditures in Janet E. Milne, “Climate Change Tax
Expenditures in the US Tax Code: A Tax Expenditure Microcosm With Environmental Dimensions”
(2009).
22
Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 6.
23
Milne, supra note 21.
24
For a critical review of Canadian climate change policy, see Jeffrey Simpson, Marc Jaccard and Nic
Rivers, Hot Air: Meeting Canada’s Climate Change Challenge, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007).
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prominent tax expenditures that Canadian governments have introduced in order limit the
growth of carbon emissions. Part IV evaluates these tax expenditures as spending
programs and tax measures. Part V concludes.
II. Background
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 17, 2002, legislatively affirming
the commitment that the federal Government made at the negotiating table five years
earlier to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 6% from the 1990 level
of 592 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emissions.25 Notwithstanding this
commitment, however, GHG emissions in Canada increased substantially in the 1990s
and 2000s – reaching 747 million tonnes in 2007, which was 26.2% higher than the 1990
level and 33.8% higher than Canada’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.26
Although economic and population and economic growth contributed
significantly to GHG emissions during this period,27 other countries have managed
impressive growth rates without corresponding increases in GHG emissions,28 suggesting

25

On the unrealistic and highly political nature of this commitment, which was designed to ensure that
promised emissions reductions in Canada would be slightly better than those promised by the United
States, see ibid. at 33-41.
26
Environment Canada, Information on Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks: Canada’s 2007 Greenhouse
Gas Inventory – A Summary of Trends, online at http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2007/somsum_eng.cfm (last accessed 23 October 2009). While GHG emissions actually decreased in some sectors
such as pulp and paper manufacturing, construction, coal mining, chemicals and metal production,
increases were significant for electricity and heat generation (24.2%), fossil fuel industries (32%),
commercial and institutional buildings (36.8%), transportation (37.5%), and fugitive emissions from oil
(39.1%), natural gas (64.8%) and venting (64.8%), and particularly high for mining and oil and gas
extraction (276.4%) – reflecting development of the Alberta tar sands. Ibid. at 6.
27
See ibid. at 2- 3 (reporting that Canada’s gross domestic product and population grew by roughly 60
percent and 20 percent respectively between 1990 and 2007). See also Simpson, et. al., supra note 1 at 8083 (explaining that Canada’s GHG emissions would have increased only 6 percent from 1990 to 2005 if the
country had experienced the same rates of population and economic growth as European countries
experienced during this period).
28
In Sweden, for example, carbon emissions decreased by almost 9% between 1990 and 2006, despite
economic growth of 44% over this period. Gwladys Fouché, “Sweden’s carbon-tax solution to climate
change puts it top of the green list,” guardian.co.uk (29 April 2008), online at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/29/climatechange.carbonemissions Likewise, Denmark
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that public policies have also played a role. Indeed, despite numerous Green Plans and
Climate Change Action Plans in the late 1990s and early 2000, the federal government
has consistently failed to introduce measures that would impose a market price on carbon
emissions, relying instead on “pious hopes and good intentions”29 backed up by
exhortations to voluntary action, government commitments to satisfy energy
requirements from renewable sources, and the introduction of selected tax incentives and
direct spending measures.30
Unlike the U.S. Government, however, the federal Government in Canada has
tended to rely more on direct expenditures than tax expenditures to encourage
investments and activities to limit carbon emissions.31 For example, while the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code provides a production tax credit for each kilowatt hour of
electricity sold during the first ten years that a windfarm is in service,32 the Canadian
government provides a similar fiscal subsidy directly in the form of a Wind Power
Production Incentive (WPPI) and a successor program called ecoENERGY for
Renewable Power.33 Likewise, while the Internal Revenue Code provides tax credits for

managed to reduce carbon emissions by 8.3% between 1990 and 2008, despite sustained economic growth
during this period. Danish Energy Agency, “Large drop in energy consumption and CO2 emissions in
2008” (18 March 2009), online at http://www.sparenergi.dk/sw80769.asp.
29
Simpson, et. al., supra note 21 at 87.
30
Although the current federal Government introduced a “regulatory framework” in 2007 promising to
limit emissions at large industrial facilities, the cap and trade regime contemplated under this framework
has yet to be put into place and involves intensity-based targets that would limit emissions per unit of
output but permit overall emissions to increase. See Government of Canada, Regulatory Framework for Air
Emissions, (2007), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/report_eng.pdf; and Government of
Canada, Ecoaction: Action on Climate Change and Air Pollution, (2007) at 4, available at
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/brochure/brochure_eng.pdf (“[A] company will have to cut its
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of production by 18% by 2010 [and] a further 2% in each and every year
after 2010”).
31
For a useful summary of these fiscal measures, see Anuschka Bakker, ed., Tax and the Environment: A
World of Possibilities, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009) at 138-62.
32
IRC, § 45.
33
The Wind Power Production Incentive was introduced in 2001 and continues to apply to projects
installed up to the end of March 2007. The ecoEnergy for Renewable Power program applies for projects
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residential energy efficiency,34 the Canadian Government provides direct grants to
encourage energy efficiency in residential, commercial and industrial buildings through
its ecoEnergy Retrofit program.35 Other direct grant programs to support clean and
renewable energy include: the federal Government’s ecoENERGY Technology Initiative,
which funds research, development and demonstration to support the development of the
next-generation clean-energy technologies such as carbon sequestration36; ecoEnergy for
Renewable Heat, which offers financial incentives to the industrial, commercial and
institutional sectors to install active energy-efficient solar air and/or water heating
systems37; and ecoEnergy for Biofuels, which provides operating incentives to producers
of renewable alternatives to gasoline and diesel.38
Provincial governments in Canada have been similarly reluctant to adopt
aggressive measures to limit carbon emissions, and have also relied on tax incentives and
spending measures for this purpose. Like the federal Government, provincial
Governments in Canada have also tended to rely more on direct spending programs than
tax expenditures when introducing fiscal subsidies to encourage reductions in carbon

installed between April 2007 through March 2011. Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy for Renewable
Power” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-ecoenergie/power-electricite/index-eng.cfm (last
accessed 24 October 2009). For a detailed discussion of the WPPI, see David G. Duff and Andrew Green,
“Wind Power in Canada” in Kurt Deketelaere, Hope Ashiabor, Larry Kreiser, and Janet Milne, eds.,
Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol. IV, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 3.
34
IRC, §§ 45L, 25C and 45M. For a detailed discussion, see Janet E. Milne, “From Simple Concept to
Complex Reality: U.S. tax Incentives to Reduce Household Use of Fossil Fuels” in Jacqueline Cottrell,
Hope Ashiabor, Larry Kreiser, and Janet Milne, eds., Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol. VI,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
35
Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy Retrofit” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergyecoenergie/retrofitsmo-renovationpmo-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 October 2009).
36
Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy Technology Initiative” online at
http://www.ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-ecoenergie/technology-technologie-eng.cfm (last accessed 24
October 2009).
37
Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy for Renewable Heat” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergyecoenergie/heat-chauffage/index-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 October 2009).
38
Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy for Biofuels” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergyecoenergie/biofuelsincentive-incitatifsbiocarburants-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 October 2009).
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emissions.39 In recent years, however, some provinces have introduced renewable
portfolio standards (RPSs) and feed-in tariffs (FITs) to encourage the production of
electricity from renewable sources,40 joined regional cap and trade regimes like the
Western Climate Initiative,41 and enacted carbon taxes to discourage the emission of
carbon dioxide.42 While it is too early to assess the impact of these measures in Canada,
there is considerable evidence that RPSs and FITs have stimulated the development of

39

In addition to the federal Government, therefore, several provinces offer direct subsidies for energy
efficiency in the form of rebates or grants to encourage household purchases of energy-efficient appliances
and home insulation. See, e.g., Government of Alberta, News Release, “Cash rebates will help Albertans be
more energy efficient” (April 9, 2009), online at http://alberta.ca/acn/200904/256878B7BE08A-F45B8F41-B19FDA5DB0C37E21.html (accessed November 1, 2009) (rebate for homeowners purchasing high
efficiency furnaces, Energy Star®® clothes washers, and insulation and hot water heaters if purchased
based on an ecoENERGY evaluation); LiveSmart BC, Government of British Columbia, “Rebates and
Incentives for Your Home” online at http://www.livesmartbc.ca/homes/incentives.html (accessed
November 1, 2009) (provincial incentives for improving efficiency of space heating, water heating, home
insulation, windows and doors, and for purchasing renewable energy generating equipment for
homeowners participating in federal ecoENERGY program); Manitoba Hydro, “Furnace and Boiler
Replacement Program” online at http://www.hydro.mb.ca/your_home/furnace_replacement_program.shtml
(accessed November 1, 2009) ($245 rebate for homeowners replacing furnaces or boilers with highefficiency natural gas models); Manitoba Hydro, “Power Smart Home Insulation Program” online at
http://www.hydro.mb.ca/your_home/home_insulation.shtml (accessed November 1, 2009) (rebate for
portion of cost of home insulation); Government of Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia EnerGuide for Houses:
Rebate Guide, (2009) at 1, online at http://www.conservens.ca/resources/energuide/EnerGuide-RebateGuide.pdf (accessed November 1 2009) at 1 (up to $1,500 in rebates for energy improvements to existing
homes in conjunction with the federal government's retrofit program); Ontario Ministry of Energy and
Infrastructure, Ontario's Energy Efficiency Resource & Funding Guide, (2009) at 7, online at
http://www.mei.gov.on.ca/english/pdf/conservation/energy_efficiency_funding.pdf (accessed November 1,
2009) (matching grants up to $5,000 for payments qualifying for support under the federal ecoEnergy
Retrofit Program); Agence de l'efficacité énergétique Québec, “Rénoclimat: Financial Assistance” (2009),
online at http://www.aee.gouv.qc.ca/en/my-home/renoclimat/financial-assistance/#c99 (accessed
November 1, 2009) (financial assistance for homeowners to improve energy efficiency of their homes); and
SaskEnergy, Saskatchewan EcoGuide for Homes, (2009), online at
http://www.saskenergy.com/saving_energy/Grant%20publication.pdf (accessed November 1, 2009)
(additional provincial grants for improvements receiving grants under the federal ecoENERGY for Homes
Retrofit program). As well, British Columbia’s Scrap-It Program provides rebate incentives of up to $1,250
for owners of inefficient older vehicles to replace their cars with new vehicles, transit passes, or bicycles.
B.C. Incentive Program, online at http://www.scrapit.ca/PIPindex.htm (accessed November 1, 2009).
40
See David. G. Duff and Andrew J. Green, “Wind Power in Canada” in K. Deketelaere et. al., eds.,
Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation – International and Comparative Perspectives: Volume IV,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 3.
41
See Western Climate Initiative (WCI), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last accessed 23 October
2009).
42
The Province of Quebec introduced a low-rate duty on bulk sales of fossil fuels in 2007, and British
Columbia enacted a broad consumption-based carbon tax effective July 1, 2008. See David G. Duff,
“Carbon Taxation in British Columbia” (2008), 10 Vt. J. Envtl.L. 87.
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renewable source electricity in jurisdictions where they have been introduced,43 and that
emissions trading and carbon taxation have limited the growth of carbon emissions in
European countries where they have been adopted.44
III. Identification
The first task of any tax expenditure analysis necessarily involves the
identification of a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure, rather than an inherent
element of the relevant tax. Although this initial task might seem relatively
straightforward, it has provoked fierce debate about the appropriate standard or
benchmark against which a tax expenditure is defined and caused some commentators to
question the relevance of tax expenditure analysis altogether.
In Stanley Surrey’s view, the concept of a tax expenditure was necessarily
premised on a normative tax base, which he equated with the Haig-Simons-Schantz
comprehensive income concept in the case of income tax expenditures,45 and a broadbased concept of consumption in the case of retail sales taxes and value-added taxes.46
For this reason, he also concluded that it was impossible to identify tax expenditures
within narrowly-based excise taxes.47

43

David G. Duff and Andrew J. Green, “Market-Based Policies for Renewable Energy Source Electricity:
A Comparative Evaluation” in N. Chalifour et. al., eds., Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation –
International and Comparative Perspectives: Volume V, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 825.
44
See, e.g., Mikael Skou Anderson, “Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing and Trading
Carbon: Some European Experiences” (2008), 10 Vt. J. Envtl.L 61.
45
Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 186. Although often associated with U.S. economists Robert
Murray Haig and Henry Simons, the concept has a German antecedent in the work of Georg van Schanz.
See Georg van Schanz, “Der Einkummensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetz,”13 Finanz-Archiv no. 1,
1-87 (1896); Robert Murray Haig, “The Concept of Income – Economic and Legal Aspects,” in R.M. Haig,
The Federal Income Tax, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921) 1; and Henry C. Simons, Personal
Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1938). For a useful survey of this “comprehensive” concept of income, see R.A. Musgrave, “In
Defense of an Income Concept” (1967) 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44.
46
Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 238.
47
Ibid. at 233.
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Although there has been very little analysis of the tax expenditure concept in the
context of broad-based sales and value-added taxes or more narrow excise taxes, the
assumed relationship between tax expenditures and the comprehensive income tax base
has been subject to considerable criticism, beginning with Boris Bittker in the 1960s,48
and continuing with more recent objections by Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey Lehman,49
Bruce Bartlett,50 and Dan Shaviro.51 Moreover, to the extent that the current “income” tax
constitutes a hybrid system comprising features of a comprehensive income tax base and
a personal consumption or expenditure tax base,52 it is impossible to characterize
consumption tax elements as departures from the “normative” tax base without making
an implicit policy choice in favour of one tax base over another.53 More boldly, David
Weisbach and Jacob Nussim argue that the substitutability between tax expenditures and
direct spending programs implies that “[t]here is no such thing as a normative tax base.”54
As the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation explains in its recent analysis of the tax
expenditure concept, the presumed relationship between tax expenditure analysis and the
comprehensive income tax base has undermined the effectiveness of tax expenditure
analysis as an impetus to reform by linking this analytical approach to a concept of
48

Boris Bittker, “Accounting for Federal ‘Tax Subsidies’ in the National Budget” (1969), 22 National Tax
Journal 22. See also Bittker’s critique of the comprehensive income concept in Boris I. Bittker, “A
‘Comprehensive Tax Base’ as a Goal of Tax Reform,” 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967).
49
Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey S. Lehman, “Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View” (1992), 54 Tax
Notes 1661.
50
Bruce Bartlett, “The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?” (2001), 92 Tax Notes 413.
51
Daniel Shaviro, “Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language” (2004), 57 Tax L. Rev. 187 at 199,
criticizing traditional tax expenditure analysis on the basis that it is premised on “a supposedly canonical,
yet in practice under-theorized and rightly controversial, official definition of the ‘normative income tax
base.’”
52
See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, and Joseph A. Pechman, Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a
Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988).
53
See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman, “Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?” (2003), 56 National Tax
Journal 613 at 618, observing that “[t]here is clearly an ideological element to the [tax expenditure
analysis] about tax bases” and concluding that “there is no objective way to resolve this dispute”).
54
David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, “The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs” (2004), 113
Yale L.J. 955.
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income that is increasingly contested.55 In contrast, it emphasizes, “[i]f tax expenditure
analysis is to enjoy broad support, it must be seen as neutral and principled.”56 For this
reason, drawing on earlier work by Seymour Fiekowsky and other tax scholars,57 the
Committee suggests that tax expenditure analysis should be limited to a more narrowly
targeted category of “tax subsidies”,58 which it defines as specific tax provisions that are
“deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a
hypothetical ‘normal’ tax)” and that collect less revenue than the general rule.59 In
addition to its virtue as a more neutral benchmark for tax expenditure analysis, this
definition is more easily applied not only to broad-based consumption taxes like retail
sales taxes and value-added taxes, but also to more narrowly targeted excise taxes which
might also include embedded tax subsidies.
With this conceptual introduction, it is now possible to identify the key tax
expenditures that federal and provincial governments in Canada have introduced in order
to limit the growth of carbon emissions. For this purpose, we employ the more neutral
concept of tax subsidies suggested by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, reviewing
tax measures that deliberately depart from an identifiable general rule within the
particular and collect less revenue than the general rule.

55

Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 35-38.
Ibid. at 36.
57
Seymour Fiekowsky, “The Relation of Tax Expenditures to the Distribution of the ‘Fiscal Burden’”
(1980), 2 Canadian Taxation 211, suggesting that a concept of “tax subsidy programs” be defined by
reference to general tax rules from which they depart, as well as their ability to be replaced by direct
expenditure programs. For similar approaches, suggesting that the concept of a tax expenditure be defined
in terms of its potential replacement by a direct spending program, see Michael J. McIntyre, “A Solution to
the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure” (1980), 14 U.C. Davis Law Review 78; and Thuronyi, supra
note 20.
58
Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 9-11 and 39-42.
59
Ibid. at 39.
56
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1. Federal Income Tax Expenditures
In addition to these direct spending programs, the Canadian Government has also
relied on tax measures to encourage energy conservation and the development of clean
and renewable energy as well as the use of public transit. This section examines each of
these tax measures.
(1) Accelerated Depreciation
Like many tax systems, the Canadian income tax does not permit the immediate
deduction of capital expenses,60 but allows for the deduction of these capital costs
through a statutory capital cost allowance (CCA) regime.61 While the rates at which
various capital assets can be depreciated for tax purposes are generally designed to reflect
the useful life of these assets, higher rates are sometimes established in order to create a
special tax incentive to encourage investments in specific classes of property since their
costs can be deducted over a shorter period of time. As these accelerated depreciation
rates are deliberately more generous than general rules for computing CCA and are
deliberately designed to encourage specific kinds of investments, they are readily
characterized as tax expenditures under the approach adopted here. Indeed, the 2008
Federal Budget affirms that accelerated CCA is “an explicit exception to the general
practice of setting CCA rates based on the useful life of assets” and “provides a financial
benefit by deferring taxation.”62

60

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (as amended), s. 18(1)(b) [hereafter “ITA”].
Ibid., s. 20(1)(a), and Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 945 (as amended), Part XI and Schedule
II [hereafter “ITR”].
62
Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2008, “Tax Measures: Supplementary Information and
Notice of Ways and Means Motions” (February 26, 2008) at 297 [hereafter 2008 Federal Budget], online at
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/pdf/plan-eng.pdf.
61
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In Canada, accelerated depreciation for investments in energy efficiency and
renewable energy has existed in one form or another since 1976, when the federal
Government introduced CCA Class 34 for equipment designed to recover heat from
industrial processes or produce heat or electricity from the consumption of wood or
municipal wastes.63 Deductible at a rate of 50 percent on a straight-line basis rather than
the usual declining basis used for most capital property,64 the cost of these capital assets
could be fully deducted over two years – much faster than the expected useful life of the
property and much faster than the 4 percent declining balance rate that would otherwise
have applied to these assets under Class 1.65 Extended in 1979 to active solar heating and
solar energy conversion equipment, generating equipment for small hydro-electric
stations, and heat recovery equipment,66 and in 1986 to equipment for wind energy
conversion systems,67 these rules represented a deliberate tax preference intended to
encourage investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy.68
While the amount that could be deducted in respect of this class of property was
limited after 1988 to income from this class determined in order to prevent the use of this
accelerated depreciation to shelter other income,69 these “specified energy property” rules
specifically excluded corporations whose principal business was “the sale, distribution or
production of electricity, natural gas, oil, steam, heat or any other form of energy or
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potential energy.”70 As a result, these “principal business corporations” can use
accelerated depreciation resulting from investments in renewable energy and energy
conservation equipment to shelter other kinds of income – another tax expenditure for
these kinds of investments, given the general rules limiting the deduction of CCA for this
purpose.
Although the federal government reduced the CCA rate for energy conservation
and renewable energy equipment in 1994 by eliminating additions to Class 34 and
including this type of property in new Class 43.1 with a declining balance rate of 30
percent,71 this reduced rate continued to be much more generous than the standard 4
percent rate under Class 1,72 and was generally more generous than depreciation rates
used for accounting purposes.73 At the same time, moreover, the federal Government
expanded the kinds of property that could qualify for CCA under this accelerated rate,74
adding the following categories to Class 43.1: fixed location photovoltaic equipment used
for generating electricity from solar energy,75 above-ground geothermal energy
equipment used primarily to generate electricity,76 above-ground equipment used
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primarily to collect landfill gas or digester gas,77 and equipment used primarily to
generate heat from the consumption of wood waste, municipal waste, landfill gas or
digester gas, if the heat energy is used directly in an industrial process.78
Since 1994, the federal Government has continued to expand the scope of Class
43.1 property in the following ways: reducing the peak capacity requirements for eligible
photovoltaic equipment in 199779; allowing electrical generating equipment using gas
that would otherwise be flared during production of crude oil to qualify in 199980;
increasing the maximum annual rated capacity for small hydro-electric stations to
accommodate run-of-the-river projects in 200181; adding qualifying fuels cells,
equipment to produce bio-oil from wood waste or other plant residues, and specified
equipment to generate heat from solar energy, wood and municipal waste, landfill gas or
digester gas for use in a greenhouse operation in 200382; extending eligibility for active
solar heating equipment, photovoltaic and fuel cell systems, and adding equipment to
generate electricity using wave or tidal energy in 200783; and extending eligibility for
waste-to-energy applications and adding ground source heat pump systems and biogas
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production equipment in 2008.84 In 2005, the federal Government also increased the tax
incentive for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency by increasing the
CCA rate for most property qualifying under Class 43.1 to 50 percent on a declining
balance basis, provided that the property was acquired after February 22, 2005 and before
2012.85 In 2007, the federal Government extended the qualification period for this higher
CCA rate to property acquired before 2020.86 According to the 2005 Federal Budget, the
tax expenditure resulting from increased accelerated depreciation for efficient and
renewable energy generation equipment was estimated at $20 million in 2005-06, $45
million in 2006-07, $65 million in 2007-08, $80 million in 2008-09, and $85 million in
2009-10.87
(2) Expensing and Flow-Through of Start-up Costs
In addition to accelerated depreciation, the federal Government introduced an
additional tax expenditure for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency in
1996 in the form of special tax treatment for Canadian renewable and conservation
expenses (CRCEs).88 Defined as various start-up expenses incurred in the development of
a project for which it is reasonable to expect that at least 50 percent of the capital cost of
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depreciable property will be property described in Class 43.1 or 43.2,89 these expenses
need not be capitalized (as would otherwise be the case) but may be deducted in the year
in which they are incurred or carried forward to future taxation years,90 or renounced in
favour of shareholders who have entered into a flow-through share agreement with a
qualifying “principal business corporation” that incurs the expense.91 According to the
1996 Federal Budget in which this category of expenses was announced, the special tax
treatment was intended to “provide the renewable energy and energy conservation sector
with improved access to financing in the early stages of their operations when they have
little or no income to utilize the income tax deductions related to these expenses.”92 The
estimated cost of this tax expenditure at the time was $5 million in 1997-98 and $10
million for 1998-99.93
Of particular significance for the development of wind power in Canada is the
subsequent inclusion of “test wind turbines” in the definition of CRCEs. First announced
in the 1997 Federal Budget,94 the inclusion of this category of expense was also made
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retroactive to expenses incurred after December 5, 1996.95 For the purpose of these rules,
a test wind turbine was initially defined as “the first such device installed at the
taxpayer’s site for a proposed wind energy conversion system” provided that “the
primary purpose of the device is to test the level of energy production at the site.”96 After
representations by the wind energy industry,97 the federal government announced on July
26, 2002 that it would amend the definition of a test wind turbine to allow more than one
turbine at each site to qualify as a test wind turbine provided that other criteria were
satisfied.98 As ultimately adopted, the amended Regulations generally allow for more
than one test wind turbine for each wind farm project provided that: (1) the wind energy
produced by these test wind turbines does not exceed 20 percent of the nameplate
capacity of the wind farm; (2) the project does not share with any other project a point of
interconnection to an electrical energy transmission or distribution system; (3)

the

primary purpose of the turbine is to test the level of wind energy produced by the turbine
at the place of installation; (4) no other turbine is installed within 1,500 metres of the
turbine; and (5) no other wind energy conversion system is installed within 1,500 metres
of the turbine until the level of electrical energy produced by the turbine has been tested
for at least 120 calendar days.99 According to a regulatory impact statement
accompanying the amended Regulation, “these amendments are expected to encourage
the development of a domestic wind energy sector.”100 According to the 1997 Budget, the
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cost of this and other environmental tax expenditures announced in the Budget were
estimated at $25 million for each of the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 fiscal years.101
(3) Tax Credit for Transit Passes
A third federal tax expenditure to limit carbon emissions was introduced in 2006
in the form of a tax credit for the cost of public transit passes.102 According to this
provision, individuals may in computing their federal tax payable deduct a specified
percentage of the cost of “eligible transit passes” and “eligible electronic payment cards”
which are attributable to the use of a public commuter transit service purchased during
the taxation year.103 For the purpose of this provision, the term “eligible transit pass” is
defined to require an unlimited right of travel for 28 consecutive days or 5 consecutive
days and 20 out of 28 days, while an “eligible electronic payment card” requires at least
32 one-way trips during an uninterrupted period of 31 days.104 The specified percentage
is defined as the lowest marginal tax rate for individuals,105 which is currently 15 percent,
meaning that individuals may obtain a 15 percent reduction in the net cost of eligible
transit passes and electronic payment cards. Since the credit is non-refundable, however,
taxpayers whose incomes are too low to pay any tax after taking into account other
credits, obtain no benefit from the credit.106
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Since commuting expenses are generally not recognized for income tax purposes
in Canada,107 this provision represents a deliberate departure from the general income tax
rules and qualifies as a tax expenditure under the approach adopted here. According to
the federal Government, the goals of the tax credit are “to make transit more affordable,
reduce traffic congestion and lower greenhouse gas emissions.”108 Initially estimated to
cost $98 million for 2006, $212 million for 2007, and $228 million for 2008,109 the
estimated cost of this tax expenditure was subsequently reduced substantially to $40
million in 2006, $110 million in 2007, $120 million in 2008, $125 million in 2009, and
$130 million in 2010.110
2. Provincial Income Tax Expenditures
Under various tax collection agreements between the federal and provincial
governments, the federal government has agreed to collect provincial income tax for
participating provinces that agree to levy their income taxes on the same tax base as the
federal definition of taxable income. As all provinces but Quebec have entered into a tax
collection agreement for the collection of personal income tax and all but Quebec and
Alberta have entered into a tax collection agreement for the collection of corporate
income tax,111 it follows that all provincial income taxes except those in Quebec and the
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corporate income tax in Alberta provide the same tax expenditures for renewable energy
and energy conservation as the federal income tax – in the form of accelerated
depreciation as well as the expensing and flow-through of start-up costs under the
definition of Canadian renewable and conservation expenses. The additional revenue cost
of these provincial tax expenditures is not included in federal revenue estimates.
In contrast to federal tax expenditures that affect the definition of taxable income,
federal tax expenditures that are delivered in the form of tax credits are not automatically
adopted at the provincial level since the tax collection agreements allow provincial
governments to determine their own tax credits. As a result, it is up to provincial
governments to decide whether to adopt a tax credit for transit passes like federal tax
credit. To date, only the Yukon Territory has introduced a similar tax credit,112 though
Nova Scotia announced that it would also introduce a tax credit for transit passes but
deferred the introduction of this credit in its 2009 Budget.113 In Quebec, on the other
hand, the 2006 Budget announced a separate tax incentive for employer-provided transit
passes, whereby employees would be exempt from tax on reimbursements of transit
passes and employer-provided transit passes, and employers would receive an additional
deduction equal to 100 percent of otherwise deductible amounts paid to reimburse
employees for transit passes or for employer-provided transit passes.114 Explicitly
introduced “[w]ith a view to promoting sustainable development and fighting climate
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change,”115 these measures were subsequently enacted as sections 38.1 and 156.8 of
Quebec's Taxation Act.116
In addition to these measures, provinces that have not agreed to a tax collection
agreement with the federal government have occasionally adopted other tax expenditures
designed to encourage renewable energy and energy conservation. In November 2002,
for example the Ontario Government announced that it would introduce a 10-year
corporate income tax holiday for income from new projects generating electricity from
clean, alternative and renewable energy sources, and a further incentive for electricity
generation from alternative and renewable sources in the form of an immediate deduction
for qualifying assets used to generate this electricity.117 In 2003, the Ontario Government
announced a further incentive in the form of an additional 100 percent deduction for
investments in qualifying assets used to generate electricity for a taxpayer’s own use
from alternative and renewable sources.118 Before these measures were fully
implemented, however, they were repealed in 2004 after the election of a new Liberal
Government.119 Under the new tax collection agreement for the collection of corporate
income tax, moreover, the Ontario Government can no longer offer separate exemptions
or deductions for alternative and renewable energy.
3. Sales Tax Expenditures
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As with income taxes, broad-based sales taxes are levied both by the federal
Government and provincial Governments in Canada – with the exception of Alberta,
which does not levy a provincial sales tax. At the federal level, this sales tax takes the
form of a 5 percent value-added tax called the Goods and Services Tax. While the
provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Quebec have harmonized
their sales taxes with the federal GST, other provinces that collect a broad-based sales tax
continue to collect separate retail sales taxes, though British Columbia and Ontario have
announced that they will harmonize their broad-based sales taxes with the federal GST
effective July 1, 2010.120 Although the federal GST and harmonized provincial sales
taxes do not contain any tax expenditures to reduce carbon emissions, climate-related
sales tax expenditures have been introduced in British Columbia, Ontario and
Saskatchewan.
In British Columbia, where PST is levied at a rate of 7 percent, the province
reduces this tax by 50 percent up to a maximum of $10,000 on purchases of hydrogen
fuel cell buses and alternative fuel buses, and up to a maximum of $5,000 on alternative
fuel shuttle buses.121 The Province also reduces PST on fuel efficient vehicles by $1,000,
$1,500 or $2,000, depending on the vehicle type and fuel efficiency,122 and by 100
percent of PST payable on hybrid electric vehicles up to a maximum reduction of
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$2,000.123 In addition, the Social Service Tax Act exempts from the provincial sales tax
“prescribed tangible personal property used for the conservation of energy....”124
Prescribed items include various types of insulating material125; EnergyStar® qualified
windows, doors and skylights126; weather stripping and caulking to prevent heat loss127;
equipment to generate energy from renewable sources (wind, solar, micro-hydro, and
tidal)128; EnergyStar® qualified heating systems129; EnergyStar® rated residential
refrigerators, freezers, and clothes washers130; energy-efficient commercial boilers131;
conversion kits for internal combustion engines to operate exclusively on electricity132;
and aerodynamic and anti-idling devices.133 Given British Columbia’s decision to
harmonize its provincial sales tax with the federal GST, it appears as though these sales
tax expenditures will terminate at that time.134
In contrast to British Columbia, Ontario has opted for a rebate system for
provincial sales tax, offering rebates of its 8 percent PST for purchases of: residential
solar energy systems; residential systems to generate electricity or heat from wind, microhydro electricity or geothermal energy; alternative fuel vehicles, powered by propane,
electricity or alternative fuels, and hybrid-electric vehicles; and various Energy Star®®
qualified household appliances that are purchased, rented, or leased between July 20,
123
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2007 and August 31, 2009.135 Although Ontario has also decided to harmonize its sales
tax with the federal GST, there does not appear to be any reason why it cannot continue
to rebate its share of Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) on goods and services that help to
reduce carbon emissions.
Like Ontario, Saskatchewan introduced a rebate system for energy efficient
household appliances subject to its 5 percent provincial sales tax in October 2003. In
April 2005, however, the provincial Government converted this rebate system into a
point-of-sale exemption.136 As Saskatchewan has no immediate plans to harmonize its
provincial sales tax with the federal GST, this tax expenditure (unlike those in the B.C.
sales tax) is not facing immanent termination.
4. Excise Tax Expenditures
In addition to income and sales tax expenditures, federal and provincial
governments in Canada have also introduced specific excise tax expenditures in order to
encourage the consumption and production of renewable transport fuels. In 1992, for
example, the federal Government exempted the ethanol portion of blended gasoline from
the federal excise tax, which applies at a rate of $0.10 per litre on unleaded gasoline and
$.0.04 per litre on diesel.137 In 2003, the biodiesel portion of blended diesel was similarly
exempted.138 Similarly, in British Columbia, which levies a separate motor fuel tax at
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rates ranging from $0.145 per litre on gasoline and $.0.15 per litre on diesel in rural areas
to $0.205 per litre on gasoline and $.0.21 per litre on diesel in the greater Vancouver
area,139 the ethanol portion of a blend with gasoline or diesel fuel is exempt from the tax
so long if the ethanol portion is between 5 and 25 percent of the total,140 the biodiesel
portion of a blended with diesel is exempt regardless of its proportion to the total,141 and
fuel with at least 85 percent ethanol or methanol is exempt from tax entirely.142 Similar
excise tax exemptions exist in Manitoba and Ontario,143 while the Province of Quebec
refunds fuel tax paid on biodiesel so long as it was not mixed with another fuel at the
time acquired.144
Although Stanley Surrey argued that tax expenditure analysis was inappropriate
for excise taxes on the grounds that they are “inherently limited in scope” and “involve
no normative tax provisions”,145 these exemptions from the normal tax rate applicable to
transport fuels are easily characterized as tax expenditures under the alternative approach
recommended by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation and adopted here.146 Indeed, their
basic purpose as tax subsidies is confirmed by recent developments in Canada, as the
federal Government and several provinces have recently repealed these tax exemptions
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and replaced them with direct subsidies to producers of renewable gasoline and diesel
alternatives in order to prevent so-called “subsidy leakage” to non-resident producers.147
Although British Columbia continues to exempt ethanol and biodiesel from the provincial
motor fuel tax, similar tax exemptions in Manitoba, Ontario, and at the federal level have
been replaced with direct subsidies to producers.148
IV. Evaluation
Having identified a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure, the next step in
tax expenditure analysis involves an evaluation of the provision as a government policy
instrument. As explained in the introduction, tax expenditures are frequently criticized as
bad spending policy and bad tax policy – bad spending policy to the extent that they are
unlimited in duration, lack a budgetary ceiling, subject to little legislative oversight,
administered by a revenue authority that has little expertise in the specific area addressed
by the tax expenditure, and poorly targeted; and bad tax policy on the ground that they
increase the complexity of the tax system, distort economic decisions, necessitate higher
tax rates to compensate for foregone revenues, and provide upside-down subsidies when
delivered in the form of deductions or exemptions.149
Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, several commentators have defended
tax expenditures as potentially attractive policy alternatives, so long as they are
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effectively monitored as de facto spending programs and designed in a manner that is
consistent with this function and minimizes inequities, inefficiencies, and administrative
complexity.150 Indeed, to the extent that they incorporate more traditional features of
direct spending programs and equitably distributed, a tax expenditure may be a better
way to provide a government subsidy than direct spending since it takes advantage of a
established mechanism both for obtaining information and economic resources from and
conveying information and economic resources to economic actors.151 As a result, as
recent defenders of tax expenditures have emphasized, where criticisms of tax
expenditures have led to the redesign of these policy instruments, the critics of tax
expenditures are in, a very real sense, victims of their own success.152
From this less critical perspective, the evaluation of a particular tax expenditure
necessarily involves three questions. First, as with any government subsidy, is there a
good social or economic reason for the existence of the subsidy? Second, once it is
decided that there is good reason for a subsidy, is there a good reason to deliver the
subsidy through the tax system rather than in the form of a direct spending program? And
third, is the tax expenditure designed in a manner that is effective in achieving its
purpose, efficient with respect to the cost incurred in terms of foregone revenue,
equitably distributed, and effectively monitored and controlled? This part of the paper
addresses each of these questions in the context of Canadian tax expenditures to reduce
carbon emissions.
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1. Subsidies to Limit Carbon Emissions
Beginning with the justification for government subsidies to limit carbon
emissions, an initial objection to any such subsidy is that it contradicts the “polluter pays
principle” which requires those who cause environmental damage to bear the costs of this
damage.153 To the extent that carbon emissions constitute a negative externality that
imposes social costs on current and future generations, one might reasonably expect that
the most appropriate policy response to this market failure would involve government
regulation to limit carbon emissions or taxation requiring those generating carbon
emissions to face the full costs of the environmental damage that these emissions
cause.154 From this perspective, it follows, government subsidies to limit carbon
emissions are a step in the wrong direction, allowing those who are directly responsible
for carbon emissions to shift the cost of reducing these emissions to society as a whole.155
Although these arguments have considerable merit, there are several reasons why
governments might justifiably subsidize at least some activities that help limit and reduce
carbon emissions. First, to the extent that specific activities generate public benefits in
addition to those enjoyed by the persons engaging in the activities, economic analysis
suggests that a subsidy may be appropriate to encourage an efficient quantity of these
activities with positive externalities.156 For this reason, governments often subsidize
research and development of new products and processes, the benefits from which are
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often enjoyed by third parties as well as whose engaging in the research and
development. For the same reason, governments might also reasonably subsidize both
research and development aimed at reducing carbon emissions as well as forms of
production and consumption leading to a reduced carbon footprint.157 Similarly, to the
extent that subsidies increase both the supply of and the demand for new products and
technologies, they can foster dynamic efficiencies that lessen the costs of these products
and technologies as markets expand and mature.158
Second, government subsidies to limit carbon emissions can serve an
informational and educational function, heightening awareness about low-carbon
activities and products and encouraging behavioural changes that contribute to reductions
in carbon emissions.159 Although governments and non-governmental organizations may
also encourage emissions reductions through information campaigns and product ratings,
subsidies can function as tangible signals that reinforce these environmental messages.
As a result, it is not surprising that governments routinely subsidize the purchases of
appliances and automobiles that satisfy standards of energy efficiency.
Third, to the extent that governments have subsidized or currently subsidize
activities that contribute to the emission of carbon dioxide, such as road transportation or
the production of oil and gas,160 subsidies for low-carbon alternatives such as public
transportation and renewable energy may be necessary to counteract other market
distortions so that low carbon alternatives can compete fairly. Although elimination of
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subsidies for high-carbon activities would contribute greatly to this policy goal, the
continuing legacy of earlier subsidies might well require compensatory measures to
create a genuinely level playing field.
A fourth rationale for government subsidies to limit carbon emissions questions
the extent to which the traditional polluter pays principle should apply in the context of
climate change policy. On the contrary, to the extent that the environmental consequences
of increasing carbon emissions over the last 200 years is a regrettable and unintended
consequence of economic development during this period,161 it follows that the costs of
minimizing carbon emissions at this point in time should be shared widely among those
who will benefit from reduced emissions, rather than imposed solely on those whose
actions contribute most to current emission levels. For this reason, while taxes and
regulatory measures may be essential policy measures to encourage reductions in carbon
emissions, government subsidies to ease the transition to a low-carbon economy may be
essential to the overall fairness of government policy in this area.
Finally, as a practical matter, it may be politically difficult for a government to
successfully introduce the kinds of regulatory and tax measures that are apt to encourage
significant reductions in carbon emissions.162 For this reason as well, therefore, subsidies
may be one of the few politically feasible methods to encourage emissions reductions.
2. Tax-Delivered Subsidies
Even if it is possible to justify government subsidies to limit carbon emissions, it
does not follow that these should be delivered through the tax system in the form of tax
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expenditures rather than as direct grants. On the contrary, given the traditional criticisms
of tax expenditures as bad spending policy and bad tax policy,163 one might reasonably
presume that government subsidies should generally be delivered through direct spending
programs rather than tax expenditures.
Notwithstanding this general presumption, however, tax expenditures may be a
less costly way to deliver government subsidies than direct spending programs to the
extent that they employ an established mechanism for allocating economic resources and
for communicating information about government policy.164 Rules for accelerated
depreciation and expensing of capital costs, for example, are based on well-established
tax rules for recognizing the cost of capital assets in computing income, and can be
delivered with little additional administrative cost except that associated with the
classification of qualifying assets for the purposes of these tax expenditures. Similarly,
sales and excise tax expenditures to encourage emissions reductions utilize wellestablished government policy instrument that can be employed with little additional
administrative cost to modify relative prices and communicate information about lowcarbon products and fuels. Although administration of the federal government’s transit
pass tax credit likely involves greater administrative costs on the part of the government
and certainly involves increased compliance costs on the part of individual taxpayers,
even it takes advantage of an established system of allocating government costs and
benefits. As a result, it is impossible to reject any of these tax expenditures without
considering their actual design.
3. Tax Expenditure Design
163
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Turning to the design of Canadian tax expenditures to limit carbon emissions,
however, there are several reasons to question these measures. Beginning with
accelerated capital cost allowance and special tax treatment for CRCEs, the first
objection is that these measures take the form of deductions in computing net income
rather than refundable tax credits, thereby favouring large and profitable taxpayers that
can make immediate use of these measures.165 While the ability to flow-through CRCEs
to investors is designed to alleviate limitations on the deductibility of these expenses,
these rules merely permit an upside-down subsidy to be shifted to the investor level and
contain a further bias to the extent that the ability to flow-through expenses is limited to
corporations whose principal business is either the generation of energy using qualifying
depreciable property or the development of projects for which it is reasonable to expect
that at least 50 percent of the capital cost of depreciable property is for qualifying
depreciable property.166
In addition to this objection, it is also worth noting that these tax expenditures do
not attempt distinguish between investments that might have been undertaken without
these incentives and investments that are stimulated by these incentives, thereby
increasing the likelihood that they provide windfall benefits to taxpayers who would have
undertaken these investments regardless of the incentive. Although it may be practically
difficult to design a tax expenditure to incorporate such a distinction, one possibility
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might be limit these tax expenditures to additional investments above a base amount
established by the taxpayer’s investments in previous taxation years.167
As well, it is particularly objectionable that Canadian tax expenditure reports
consistently fail to clearly account for these tax expenditures, reporting the cost of all
accelerated depreciation (not only for investments in renewable energy and energy
conservation equipment) as “not available” despite some estimates of projected foregone
revenue in Federal Budgets, and failing to distinguish flow-though share treatment for
CRCEs from other flow through arrangements.168
Finally, there is very little evidence that accelerated depreciation and other tax
measures to allow for the immediate expensing or flow-through of qualifying
expenditures has had much effect on the rate of investment in renewable energy or energy
conservation, which appears to have been driven more by measures such as renewable
portfolio standards and feed-in-tariffs that increase the demand for these investments than
it has by measures reducing the cost of these investments.169 Indeed, the federal
Government itself recognizes the uncertain effectiveness of these measures to encourage
renewable energy and energy conservation, acknowledging in a Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement accompanying amendments to the scope of Class 43.1 property in
2000 that:
The benefits of the Canadian renewable and conservation expense and Class 43.1
Regulations are difficult to quantify. To the extent that the measures encourage
development of a successful domestic renewable energy and energy conservation
sector, significant environmental benefits will accrue in the form of reduced
167
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greenhouse gas emissions and reduced reliance on fossil fuels. Tangible economic
benefits of renewable energy are many years away, given that this industry is still
in the development stage.170
As a result, one might reasonably question the merits of accelerated depreciation and
flow-through rules as ways to encourage renewable energy and energy conservation.
Turning to tax expenditures for transit passes, the traditional criticism about
upside-down subsidies may also be levied against the non-taxation of employer-provided
or reimbursed transit passes in Quebec as well as the additional deduction for employerprovided or reimbursed transit passes.171 As well, although it might be argued that
employer control over access to these tax expenditures might help target the incentive to
employees who would not otherwise use public transit, it is also likely that employers and
employees will obtain a windfall simply by shifting from taxable to non-taxable
compensation in the form of tax-free and double-deductible transit passes without
significantly shifting employee behaviour. Like accelerated depreciation, therefore, this
tax expenditure is poorly targeted to influence behaviour at the margin. The same
criticism may also be directed at the federal transit tax credit, which does not depend on
any measure of increased ridership, and is therefore apt to provide a windfall to transit
riders who would have purchased passes without the tax expenditure. Moreover, although
this tax expenditure is delivered in the form of a tax credit, the credit is not refundable, as
a result of which effective access to the credit depends on claimants having enough tax
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payable after deducting other credits against which the transit tax credit may be offset.172
A final deficiency involves the compliance burden on taxpayers, who must maintain
receipts for qualifying transit passes purchased during the year and claim the credit well
after these passes have been purchased in filing their tax returns for the relevant taxation
year. For this reason as well, therefore, one might reasonably question the merits of the
federal transit tax credit.
Finally, Canadian sales and excise tax expenditures to limit the growth of carbon
emissions may also be criticized on the grounds that they have been subject to little
legislative scrutiny, are not well targeted to affect marginal behaviour, and are of
uncertain effectiveness. As provincial governments in Canada do not produce regular tax
expenditure reports, there is no ongoing accounting of these tax expenditures in order to
assess their costs in terms of foregone revenue against their expected benefits. Nor is it
apparent that reduced sales or excise taxes on energy efficient appliances or renewable
fuels actually encourage enough additional consumption to justify the revenue losses
attributable to these tax expenditures, as consumers may simply obtain a windfall for
purchases that they would have made in any event. Nor is it clear that increased
purchases of energy-efficient appliances and biofuels necessarily reduce emissions of
carbon dioxide, as consumers may use energy-efficient appliances (like dishwashers)
more frequently, and there is increasing evidence that subsidies to the consumption of
biofuels is a costly and environmentally questionable way to reduce carbon emissions.173
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As a result, although Canadian sales and excise tax expenditures may be relatively simple
to administer and comply with and cannot be criticized on the grounds that they provide
upside-down subsidies, they are vulnerable to the criticism that they represent bad
spending policy.
V. Conclusion
This paper has endeavoured to identify and evaluate the most significant tax
expenditures aimed at limiting the growth of carbon emissions in Canada. Reviewing the
concept of tax expenditures, it began by questioning Stanley Surrey’s original
formulation linking the concept income tax expenditures to the Schantz-Haig-Simons tax
concept of income and rejecting the notion of excise tax expenditures,174 favouring
instead the approach favoured by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation which limits tax
expenditure analysis to a more narrowly defined category of tax subsidies which are
deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the tax legislation and collect
less revenue than the general rule.175 On this basis, it identified several federal and
provincial tax expenditures aimed at reducing the growth of carbon emissions, and
evaluated these measures as spending programs and tax provisions.
While this paper does not reject the use of tax expenditures as a policy instrument
to limit the growth of carbon emissions out of hand, it has serious reservations about the
merits of current federal and provincial tax expenditures for this purpose. If Canadian
governments are to continue to utilize tax expenditures to help fight climate change, they
should pay closer attention to the insights of tax expenditure analysis and design these
policy instruments accordingly.
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